The Case for Clean Coal

Ken Capstick, former Vice President of Yorkshire National Union of Mineworkers gives a speech on British and world energy issues and makes the case for the use of Clean Coal utilising Carbon Capture and Storage as an integral part of an Integrated Energy Policy for Britain.

Essential listening for anyone concerned for future energy provision and a world that tackles CO2 emissions in the only practical way available.

Ayrshire, Scotland.

May 2010

'We could surrender - or stand and fight'

ARTHUR SCARGILL – The Guardian 7th March 2009


Twenty-five years ago, the Tory government led by Margaret Thatcher declared war on the National Union of Mineworkers. The Tories had been preparing for a showdown with the NUM since before the 1979 general election. They could not forget the victorious miners' strikes of 1972 and 1974, the second of which had brought down the Tory government in a general election.

But the NUM's historic battle did not begin in March 1984, as so many pundits claim. The seeds of the dispute had been sown long before. A pit closure plan in 1981 resulted in miners, including miners in Nottinghamshire, taking unofficial strike action (without a ballot) and forcing Thatcher into a U-turn, or in reality a body swerve.

At that time, Britain's coal industry was the most efficient and technologically advanced in the world, a result of a tripartite agreement, the Plan For Coal, signed by a Labour government, the National Coal Board (NCB) and the mining trade unions in 1974, and endorsed by Thatcher in 1981. And yet, shortly after I became national president of the NUM in 1982 I was sent anonymously a copy of a secret plan prepared by NCB chiefs earmarking 95 pits for closure, with the loss of 100,000 miners' jobs. This plan had been prepared on government instructions following the miners' successful unofficial strike in 1981.

I took this document to the union's National Executive Committee (NEC) - its contents were not only denied by government and NCB chiefs, but were disbelieved by militant NUM leaders who had been assured that their pits had long-term futures. However, the exposed revelations struck a chord among our members throughout Britain's coalfields where colliery managers - clearly acting on instructions from above - had already begun unilaterally changing agreed working practices, affecting shift patterns and supplementary payments.

It became clear that the union would have to take action, but of a type that would win maximum support and have a unifying effect. The NEC accepted a report from me recommending that we call a special national delegate conference, and link our opposition to the pit closure plan with a demand that the coal board negotiate the union's wage claim. The NEC agreed, and the special conference was held on 21 October 1983. Delegates from all NUM areas were given a detailed report so that they could vote on what action - if any - should be taken. Following a full debate, they agreed to call a national overtime ban from 1 November - until such time as the NCB withdrew its closure plan and agreed to negotiate an increase in miners' wages with the NUM.
Over the next four months, the overtime ban had an extraordinary impact. It succeeded in reducing coal output by 30%, or 12m tonnes, thus cutting national coal stocks to about the same level as they had been during the miners' unofficial strike in 1981.

Then, on 1 March 1984, acting I believe on national instruction, NCB directors in four areas announced the immediate closure of five pits: Cortonwood and Bullcliffe Wood in Yorkshire, Herrington in Durham, Snowdown in Kent and Polmaise in Scotland.

Coalfield reaction was electrifying. On Saturday 3 March, accompanied by the NUM Yorkshire president, Jack Taylor, I spoke at a packed meeting in South Yorkshire initially organised to discuss various issues that had already brought seven Yorkshire pits out on strike. I knew we had to do everything possible to persuade our members to direct their rage in a united way at the pit closure plan and its threat to butcher our industry.

On Sunday evening Taylor and I attended a Yorkshire Brass Band Festival in Sheffield city hall. By then I had consulted my fellow national officials, the vice-president, Michael McGahey, and the national secretary, Peter Heathfield.

It was essential to present a united response to the NCB and we agreed that, if the coal board planned to force pit closures on an area by area basis, then we must respond at least initially on that same basis. The NUM's rules permitted areas to take official strike action if authorised by our national executive committee in accordance with Rule 41. If the NEC gave Scotland and Yorkshire authorisation under this rule, it could galvanise other areas to seek similar support for action against closures.

During an interval in the concert, I used the back of a programme to draft a strike resolution which I asked Taylor to present the following morning to the Yorkshire area council meeting. I told him that McGahey would be doing the same thing at the same time in Scotland.

On 6 March, at a consultative meeting at NCB London headquarters, the coal board chairman, Ian MacGregor, not only confirmed what we had been expecting, but announced that in addition to the five pits already earmarked for immediate closure, a further 20 would be closed during the coming year, with the loss of more than 20,000 jobs. This, he said, was being done to take four million tonnes of "unwanted" capacity out of the industry, and bring supply into line with demand.

The Scotland and Yorkshire NUM areas did vote to seek endorsement from the NEC for strike action, and at the NEC meeting on 8 March were given authorisation under Rule 41. South Wales and Kent then also asked for authorisation. The NEC agreed, and confirmed that other areas could, if they wished, do the same. We realised that the NCB announcement on 6 March had amounted to a declaration of war. We could either surrender right now, or stand and fight.
A question that has been raised time and time again over the past 25 years is: why did the union not hold a national strike ballot? Those who attack our struggle by vilifying me usually say: "Scargill rejected calls for a ballot."

The real reason that NUM areas such as Nottinghamshire, South Derbyshire and Leicestershire wanted a national strike ballot was that they wanted the strike called off, believing naively that their pits were safe.

Three years earlier, in 1981, there had been no ballot when miners' unofficial strike action - involving Notts miners - had caused Thatcher to retreat from mass closures (nor in 1972 when more than a million workers went on strike in support of the Pentonville Five dockers who had been jailed for defying government anti-union legislation).

McGahey argued that the union should not be "constitutionalised" out of taking action, while the South Wales area president, Emlyn Williams, told the NEC on 12 April 1984: "To hide behind a ballot is an act of cowardice. I tell you this now ... decide what you like about a ballot but our coalfield will be on strike and stay on strike."

However, NUM areas had a right to ask the NEC to convene a special national delegate conference (as we had when calling the overtime ban) to determine whether delegates mandated by their areas should vote for a national individual ballot or reaffirm the decision of the NEC to permit areas such as Scotland, Yorkshire, South Wales and Kent to take strike action in accordance with Rule 41.

Our special conference was held on 19 April. McGahey, Heathfield and I were aware from feedback that a slight majority of areas favoured the demand for a national strike ballot; therefore, we were expecting and had prepared for that course of action with posters, ballot papers and leaflets. A major campaign was ready to go for a "Yes" vote in a national strike ballot.
At the conference, Heathfield told delegates in his opening address: "I hope that we are sincere and honest enough to recognise that a ballot should not be used and exercised as a veto to prevent people in other areas defending their jobs." His succinct reminder of the situation we were in opened up an emotional debate to which speaker after speaker made passionate and fiercely argued contributions.

Replying to that debate, I said: "This battle is certainly about more than the miners' union. It is for the right to work. It is for the right to preserve our pits. It is for the right to preserve this industry ... We can all make speeches, but at the end of the day we have got to stand up and be counted ... We have got to come out and say not only what we feel should be done, but do it because if we don't do that, then we fail."

McGahey, Heathfield and I had done the arithmetic beforehand, and were truly surprised that when the vote was taken, delegates rejected calls for a national strike ballot and decided instead to call on all miners to refuse to cross picket lines - and join the 140,000 already on strike. We later learned that members of one area delegation had been so moved by the arguments put forward in the debate that they'd held an impromptu meeting and switched their vote in support of the area strikes in accordance with Rule 41.

During the strike I was also criticised, indeed attacked - by my own colleagues - for arguing that the NUM's prime picketing targets should be power stations, ports, cement works, steelworks and coking plants. But evidence now available shows my argument was correct.

My passionate conviction that the Orgreave coking plant in South Yorkshire should be selected as a main target was rubbished at the time. Yet, it has now been revealed from official sources that show coal stocks at steel plants - particularly Scunthorpe in Yorkshire, Ravenscraig in Scotland and Llanwern in Wales - were so low that these works could only continue in production for a matter of weeks, with Scunthorpe - where British Steel had already laid off 160 workers due to coal shortages - actually earmarked for closure by 18 June 1984.

The issue of dispensations that would allow provision of coal supplies created divisions among the most militant sections of the NUM. I had argued passionately that there should be no dispensations for power stations, cement works, steelworks or coking plants, whose coal stocks were extremely low.

Many on the union's left - particularly those in the Communist party - argued that the union had a responsibility to ensure that a minimal amount of coal could be delivered in order to keep the giant furnaces and ovens "ticking over". Heathfield and a number of others on the NUM left agreed with me that there should be no dispensations and that if steelworks had to close down, as British Steel's chairman, Bob Haslam, warned was inevitable, then the responsibility lay firmly at the door of the government, not the NUM.

Despite the passionate arguments made by Heathfield and myself, areas did give dispensations. Two months went by before it dawned on Yorkshire, South Wales and Scotland that they had been outmanoeuvred by British Steel, and the leadership of the steelworkers' union, and that British Steel was moving far more coal than the dispensations agreed with NUM areas. Yet there was still time to stop all those giant steelworks, and if the steelworkers' union would not cooperate with the NUM to stop all deliveries of coal to the steelworks then the National Union of Seamen and rail unions Aslef and NUR had already demonstrated that they would stop all deliveries.

The scene was set for the battle of Orgreave.

Orgreave coking plant was a crucial target for mass picketing. I knew that its coal supplies could be cut off as had been the case at the Saltley coke depot in Birmingham in 1972 - a turning point after which that strike was soon settled.

Contrary to popular mythology, Orgreave was closed twice: first on 27 May 1984, when together with dozens of others I was injured on the picket line. Second, on 18 June, when 10,000 pickets faced 8,500 riot police in a scene reminiscent of a battle in England's 17th-century civil war.
So fierce was the conflict on 18 June that dozens of pickets were hospitalised (including me), but the picketing resulted in British Steel's chairman sending a telex closing down Orgreave on a temporary basis - exactly as had been the case at Saltley coke depot in Birmingham 12 years before.

The fundamental difference between Saltley in 1972 and Orgreave in 1984 was that in 1972 following the first closure at Saltley, picketing on my demand was increased the following day - while at Orgreave, on 19 June 1984, the pickets were completely withdrawn by the NUM Yorkshire and Derbyshire areas and other coalfield leaders, despite my desperate urging that picketing be stepped up.

Had picketing at Orgreave been increased the day after 18 June, I have no doubt that Orgreave - and Scunthorpe - would have faced immediate closure, forcing the government to settle the strike.

For 25 years, I have been accused of refusing to negotiate a settlement with the NCB, and of "snatching defeat from the jaws of victory" - a blatant lie. The NUM settled the strike on five separate occasions in 1984: on 8 June, 8 July, 18 July, 10 September, and 12 October. The first four settlements were sabotaged or withdrawn following the intervention of Thatcher.

The most important settlement terms were agreed between leaders of the pit deputies' union Nacods and the NUM at the offices of the conciliation service Acas on 12 October 1984 and included a demand that the NCB withdraw its pit closure plan, give an undertaking that the five collieries earmarked for immediate closure would be kept open, and guarantee that no pit would be closed unless by joint agreement it was deemed to be exhausted or unsafe.

Nacods members had recorded an 82% ballot vote for strike action, and their leaders made clear to the NCB that unless the Nacods-NUM terms were accepted, the Nacods strike would go ahead.

I was later told by a Tory who had been a minister at the time that when Thatcher was informed of the Nacods-NUM agreement she announced to the cabinet "special committee" that the government had no choice but to settle the strike on the unions' terms.

However, when she learned that Nacods - despite pleas from the TUC and the NUM - had called off their strike and accepted a "modified" colliery review procedure, she immediately withdrew the government's decision to settle. Nacods' inexplicable decision led to the closure of 164 pits and the loss of 160,000 jobs.

The monumental betrayal by Nacods has never been explained in a way that makes sense. Even the TUC recognised that the Nacods settlement was a disaster.

The fact that Nacods leaders ignored pleas from the NUM and TUC not to call off their strike or resile from their agreement with the NUM not only adds mystery but poses the question - whose hand did the moving, and why?

Over the years, I have repeatedly said that we didn't "come close" to total victory in October 1984 - we had it, and at the very point of victory we were betrayed. Only the Nacods leaders know why.

A full account of the strike of 1984/85 is still to be written. However, we have learned more and more about the then Labour party leader, Neil Kinnock's treachery, the betrayals by the TUC and the class collaboration of union leaders such as Eric Hammond (the electricians' EETPU) and John Lyons (Engineers and Managers Association), who instructed their members to cross picket lines and did all they could to defeat the miners.

We have also seen how many who, like Kinnock, bleated constantly about the need for a ballot during the miners' strike didn't call for the British people to have a ballot in 2003 when Tony Blair took the nation into an unlawful war and the occupation of Iraq.

During the past 25 years, many who have attacked the NUM, and me, about the need for a ballot, or argued that we selected the wrong targets have done so to cover their own guilt at failing to give the miners a level of support that would have stopped the Tories' pit closure programme and thus changed the political direction of the nation. Britain in 1984 was already a divided and degraded society - it has become much more so in the 25 years since.

The NUM's struggle remains not only an inspiration for workers but a warning to today's union leaders of their responsibility to their members, and the need to challenge both government and employers over all forms of injustice, inequality and exploitation.

That is the legacy of the NUM's strike of 1984/85, a truly historic fight that gave birth to the magnificent Women Against Pit Closures and the miners' support groups. I have always said that the greatest victory in the strike was the struggle itself, a struggle that inspired millions of people around the world.

• On 12 March, at 7.30pm, Arthur Scargill will be speaking on the lessons of the 1984/85 miners' strike at the Conway Hall, Red Lion Square, London, WC1

Ends

THE CASE FOR AN INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY

On Saturday 1st November 2008 Arthur Scargill gave the following presentation to a Climate Change conference in Newcastle.


ENVIRONMENTALISTS, PROPONENTS OF NUCLEAR POWER AND THE GOVERNMENT ALL REFER TO CLIMATE CHANGE WHEN THE PROBLEM IS GLOBAL WARMING.

THE EARTH HAS WITNESSED CLIMATE CHANGE FOR MILLIONS OF YEARS AND HAS INCLUDED DROUGHTS, AN ICE AGE AND DRAMATIC CHANGES WHICH ARE NATURAL PHENOMENA.

GLOBAL WARMING HAS, OF COURSE, AN EFFECT ON THE CLIMATE BUT AN EFFECT WHICH SHOULD BE VIEWED IN CONTEXT.ENVIRONMENTALISTS ARGUE THAT THE ANSWER TO GLOBAL WARMING IS TO STOP THE USE OF COAL AND RELY INSTEAD ON RENEWABLE ENERGY.

THEY ARE EITHER UNAWARE OR CONVENIENTLY IGNORE THE FACT THAT 92% OF CO2 IN THE UK IS PRODUCED NOT BY COAL BUT BY OIL, GAS AND DEFORESTATION.

WE ARE FACING AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS ON A SCALE SIMILAR TO THE WALL STREET CRASH IN 1929 AND THE MASS UNEMPLOYMENT WHICH AFFECTED THE UK AND EUROPE IN THE NINETEEN THIRTIES.OVER 10 MILLION PEOPLE IN BRITAIN ARE "LIVING" ON OR BELOW THE POVERTY LINE WHILST OVER 1 MILLION CHILDREN DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH FOOD AND ARE CATEGORISED AS "GOING HUNGRY".

OVER 11/2 MILLION PEOPLE ARE ON HOUSING WAITING LISTS AT A TIME WHEN THOUSANDS OF PROPERTIES STAND EMPTY AND THREE-QUARTERS OF A MILLION BUILDING WORKERS ARE UNEMPLOYED.ENERGY AND FOOD COSTS HAVE ROCKETED AND PEOPLE TODAY ARE PAYING OVER 300% MORE FOR ENERGY AND 80% MORE FOR FOOD THAN TWO YEARS AGO.

WE ARE FACING A MONUMENTAL ENERGY CRISIS WITH THE UK'S NATURAL GAS SUPPLIES VIRTUALLY EXHAUSTED, ITS INDIGENOUS OIL SUPPLIES ARE NEARING EXHAUSTION YET WE LIVE ON AN ISLAND WITH OVER ONE THOUSAND YEARS OF COAL FROM WHICH WE CAN EXTRACT ALL THE OIL, GAS, ELECTRICITY AND PETROCHEMICALS THAT WE NEED WITHOUT CAUSING HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT.

BRITAIN HAS NEVER HAD AN INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY AND AS A CONSEQUENCE WE ARE NOW FACING THE WORST ENERGY CRISIS IN OUR HISTORY.SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR,

BOTH LABOUR AND TORY GOVERNMENTS HAVE SOUGHT TO REPLACE BRITAIN'S VAST COAL RESERVES - OVER ONE THOUSAND YEARS' SUPPLY OF DEEP MINE COAL - WITH FALSE PROMISES OF "CHEAP" IMPORTED OIL - "CHEAP SAFE" NUCLEAR ENERGY AND "CHEAP" NATURAL GAS.THESE POLICIES HAVE NOT ONLY COST THE BRITISH PEOPLE BILLIONS OF POUNDS BUT HAVE RESULTED IN THE NEAR-EXTINCTION OF BRITAIN'S DEEP MINE COAL INDUSTRY AND BROUGHT ABOUT MASSIVE ECONOMIC, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS.

HAVING SEEN THE CLOSURE OF 200 PITS SINCE 1980 AND THE LOSS OF 200,000 JOBS, THE CLOSURE OR NON-OPERATION OF NEARLY 70% OF COAL-FIRED POWER STATIONS ON THE FALSE PREMISE THAT THEY WERE UNECONOMIC AND A MAJOR POLLUTER OF CO2, IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A DRAMATIC FALL IN CO2 EMISSIONS.

IN FACT, CO2 EMISSIONS HAVE INCREASED SINCE 1993. FOLLOWING THE SHORTSIGHTED POLICY OF THE DASH FOR GAS WHICH RESULTED IN FURTHER PIT CLOSURES AND A SWITCH FROM COAL TO GAS-FIRED POWER STATIONS IT WOULD - IF THE ENVIRONMENTALST AND NUCLEAR LOBBY WERE RIGHT - HAVE RESULTED IN A SUBSTANTIAL DECREASE IN CO2 EMISSIONS - THE VERY OPPOSITE IS THE CASE.

IN 1993, TOTAL CO2 EMISSIONS BY SOURCE WERE:-

YEAR 1993

OIL 208.5 MILLION TONNES

COAL AND OTHER SOLID FUELS 206.1 MILLION TONNES

GAS 134.2 MILLION TONNES

NON-FUEL 18.3 MILLION TONNES

TOTAL 567.1 MILLION TONNES

Fig 1

BY 2007, THE POSITION HAD CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY,

I.E. YEAR 2007

GAS 194 MILLION TONNES

OIL 185 MILLION TONNES

COAL AND OTHER SOLID FUELS 150 MILLION TONNES

NON-FUEL 15 MILLION TONNES

TOTAL 544 MILLION TONNES

Fig 2

THESE FIGURES, HOWEVER, ARE NOT ONLY MISLEADING BUT UNTRUE.

ACCORDING TO THE NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, CO2 EMISIONS ARE UNDERSTATED BY 189 MILLION TONNES, NOT SURPRISING IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS DELIBERATELY OMITTED CO2 EMISSIONS FROM AVIATION, SHIPPING AND DEFORESTATION.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE STATISTICS BY THE NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, A MORE ACCURATE PICTURE EMERGES:-

YEAR 2007

OIL 374 MILLION TONNES

GAS 194 MILLION TONNES

COAL AND OTHER SOLID FUELS 150 MILLION TONNES

NON-FUEL - DEFORESTATION 15 MILLION TONNES

TOTAL 733 MILLION TONNES

Fig 3

IN SIMPLE TERMS, OIL, GAS AND DEFORESTATION NOW PRODUCE 80% OF ALL CO2 EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. FIGURES DON'T LIE BUT LIARS CAN FIGURE, AT LEAST THAT'S THE CONCLUSION ONE MUST COME TO WHEN COMPARING THE NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE CALCULATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S INACCURATE STATISTICS AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS.

AT THE PRESENT TIME, RENEWABLE ENERGY PRODUCES ONLY 5% OF BRITAIN'S ENERGY NEEDS YET ENVIRONMENTALISTS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE UK MUST STOP USING COAL - WHICH PRODUCES ONLY 20% CO2 IN THE UK AND 2% OF CO2 EMISSIONS WORLDWIDE.SOME ENVIRONMENTALISTS EVEN SAY IT MAY NOW BE NECESSARY TO ACCEPT NUCLEAR ENERGY, IGNORING THE FACT THAT NUCLEAR ENERGY ONLY GENERATES ELECTRICITY AND IS OF NO USE FOR OTHER INDUSTRIAL OR DOMESTIC USE.

I WAS CHAIRMAN OF ENERGY 2000, AN ORGANISATION ESTABLISHED IN 1977, SUPPORTED BY THE NUM, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, GREENPEACE AND ALL THE ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUPS.ENERGY 2000 PRESENTED EVIDENCE AT THE WINDSCALE, SIZEWELL AND HINCKLEY POINT PUBLIC ENQUIRIES, PUTTING A POWERFUL CASE AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER.ENERGY 2000 AND ALL THE ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS CAMPAIGNED IN THE 1970s AND 1980s FOR AN INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY BASED ON UK DEEP MINE CLEAN COAL AND RENEWABLE ENERGIES SUCH AS WIND, WAVE, TIDE, BARRAGE, HYDRO, GEOTHERMAL AND SOLAR POWER TOGETHER WITH INSULATION AND CONSERVATION.

THE DISASTERS AT THREE-MILE ISLAND IN 1979 AND CHERNOBYL IN 1986 WHICH WILL RESULT IN THOUSANDS OF DEATHS OVER A 30 TO 40 YEAR PERIOD, DEMONSTRATED THAT OUR POLICY WAS RIGHT.BASED ON THE EVIDENCE OF DR ROBERT GALE, THE CANCER EXPERT, WHO TREATED VICTIMS IN CHERNOBYL, IT IS PROJECTED THAT THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER ALONE WILL RESULT IN OVER 100,000 DEATHS.

THESE FIGURES ONLY RELATE TO ONE DISASTER AND NOT TO THE CONTINUED RADIATION CONTAMINATION BOTH WITHIN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY AND IN AND AROUND NUCLEAR PLANTS.EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY EXPERTS SUCH AS Dr ALICE STEWART AND DR ROSIE BERTELL SHOWS AN INCREASED DEATH RATE FROM LEUKAEMIA AND CANCER IN AND AROUND NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS 10% HIGHER THAN IN THE GENERAL POPULATION.ON 13 DECEMBER 1986, DR KENNETH DUNCAN, FORMER HEAD OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMISSION'S EMPLOYMENT MEDICAL ADVISORY SERVICE AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION BOARD ADMITTED THAT IF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN THE UK WITH A 100 PER CENT RELEASE OF CORE CONTENTS, IT COULD RESULT IN UP TO 2 MILLION DEATHS (TUC REPORT, 23 JANUARY 1987).THE CONSTRUCTION, RUNNING COSTS AND DECOMMISSIONING COSTS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY ARE HORRENDOUS - THE CURRENT ESTIMATE FOR DECOMMISSIONING EXISTING NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS IN BRITAIN IS £73 BILLION. THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SELECT COMMITTEE IN 1989 REPORTED THAT THE REAL COST OF AGR AND PWR NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS WOULD BE 400% MORE EXPENSIVE THAN ELECTRICITY FROM A COAL-FIRED POWER STATION.BRITAIN NEEDS AN INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY, BASED ON INDIGENOUS DEEP MINE COAL AND RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES SUCH AS WIND, WAVE, TIDE, BARRAGE, HYDRO, GEOTHERMAL AND SOLAR POWER, A POLICY FREE FROM UNILATERAL PRICE INCREASES OR THE INTERRUPTION OR ENDING OF SUPPLY.

CARBON CAPTURE TECHNOLOGY DOES EXIST AND WE CAN - WITH THE PROPER INVESTMENT - UTILISE UK DEEP MINE COAL IN A WAY WHICH WILL RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF 90% OF CO2 EMISSIONS.

CURRENTLY THE UK'S ENERGY NEEDS ARE MET BY OIL, GAS AND COAL. HOWEVER, THE UK IS ALREADY A NET IMPORTER OF OIL, GAS AND COAL AND BY 2020 IMPORTS OF OIL, UNCONVENTIONAL OILS SUCH AS SHALE OIL, TAR SAND AND GAS WILL - UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT IS STOPPED - ACCOUNT FOR 80% OF THE UK'S ENERGY NEEDS.

THIS POSITION IS UNACCEPTABLE BOTH IN TERMS OF GUARANTEE OF SUPPLY AND THE MASSIVE COSTS TO BRITAIN'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE MET BY THE CONSUMER WHO ARE CURRENTLY PAYING 300% MORE FOR GAS AND OIL, AT A TIME WHEN OIL COMPANIES SUCH AS BP AND ROYAL DUTCH SHELL ARE RECORDING PROFITS OF £6.4 AND £6.6 BILLION RESPECTIVELY FOR THE THIRD QUARTER OF 2008.

UNLESS THERE IS A DRAMATIC POLICY CHANGE, WE WILL SEE THE UK HAVE AN ENERGY POLICY BASED ON OIL AND GAS IMPORTS AND EXPENSIVE AND HIGHLY DANGEROUS NUCLEAR POWER WHICH USES URANIUM AS A PRIMARY FUEL, A FINITE ENERGY SOURCE WHICH WILL BE EXHAUSTED WITHIN 50 YEARS.DR KENNETH DUNCAN CONFIRMED TO THE TUC IN 1986 THAT LUNG CANCER RATES AMONG URANIUM MINERS WAS 3 TO 5 TIMES HIGHER THAN IN THE GENERAL POPULATION AND IF URANIUM MINERS IN NAMIBIA WERE INCLUDED, IT WAS MUCH HIGHER.

ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND ECO-WARRIORS HAVE BEEN HIGHLY VISIBLE IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW COAL-FIRED POWER STATION AT KINGSNORTH AND THE DRAX POWER STATION IN WEST YORKSHIRE.YET THEY HAVE BEEN CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR ABSENCE IN THE CAMPAIGN TO STOP OPEN-CAST COALMINING WHICH PRODUCES 54% OF THE UK'S INDIGENOUS COAL AND ACCOUNTS FOR NOT ONLY CO2 EMISSIONS AT SOURCE BUT FOR MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF METHANE, A GAS 23 TIMES MORE POTENT AND DAMAGING TO GLOBAL WARMING THAN CO2.THERE HAS BEEN A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST INDIGENOUS DEEP MINE COAL PRODUCTION SINCE THE MINERS INFLICTED MASSIVE DEFEAT ON THE TORY GOVERNMENT IN 1972 AND 1974, A POLICY WHICH HAS SEEN THE CLOSURE OF OVER 200 PITS.THE UK CURRENTLY USES NEARLY 63 MILLION TONNES OF COAL PER YEAR, OF WHICH 44 MILLION TONNES ARE IMPORTED AND 9 MILLION TONNES ARE PRODUCED BY HIGHLY POLLUTING OPEN-CAST SITES.

IN OTHER WORDS, 85% OF BRITAIN'S COAL SUPPLY EMANATES FROM IMPORTS OR OPEN-CAST SITES WHILST ONLY 15% IS PRODUCED IN BRITISH DEEP MINES.THE REASON FOR THIS POLICY IS CLEAR FROM THE SECRET CABINET MINUTE LEAKED ON 23 OCTOBER 1979 WHICH STATED - "A NUCLEAR PROGRAMME WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF REMOVING A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF ELECTRICITY FROM DISRUPTION BY INDUSTRIAL ACTION OF COAL MINERS AND TRANSPORT WORKERS"THIS EXPLAINS WHY THE TORY GOVERNMENT WAS DETERMINED TO CLOSE BRITAIN'S DEEP MINE COAL INDUSTRY.

IT ALSO EXPLAINS WHY THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT HAS REFUSED TO HONOUR ITS UNDERTAKING TO THE NUM TO RE-OPEN PITS CLOSED BETWEEN 1984 AND 1997 AND DEVELOP NEW MINES AND COALFIELDS IN LINE WITH THE 1974 PLAN FOR COAL.THE PLAN FOR COAL WAS DESIGNED TO PROTECT BRITAIN FROM AN ENERGY CRISIS. IT WAS A PLAN WHICH WOULD HAVE AMELIORATED THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS WHICH IS PLUNGING THE UK INTO ECONOMIC CHAOS.

WE HAVE SEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMBINED CYCLE GAS TURBINE (CCGT) TECHNOLOGY IN GAS-FIRED POWER STATIONS, YET THERE HAS BEEN NO REAL ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE AN INTEGRATED GASIFICATION COMBINED CYCLE (IGCC) IN COAL-FIRED POWER STATIONS.IN ADDITION, WHILST GAS AND NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS ARE RUN ON BASE LOAD, COAL-FIRED POWER STATIONS HAVE BEEN USED ON PEAK TIME. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE UK'S 18 COAL-FIRED POWER STATIONS COULD ALL BE FITTED WITH CARBON CAPTURE TECHNOLOGY AND WHILST THE CRITICS CLAIM THAT THIS TECHNOLOGY IS NOT YET FULLY DEVELOPED, THE GOVERNMENT IN 2003 REPORTED THAT A SMALL SCALE CARBON CAPTURE SCHEME WAS SUCCESSFULLY OPERATING IN THE USA WHICH REMOVED 90% OF CO2 EMISSIONS.

WE HAVE SEEN THIS YEAR THE DEVELOPMENT AT THE ENEL'S TORRE POWER STATION IN ITALY A NEW "CLEAN" COAL-FIRED POWER STATION - WITHOUT CARBON CAPTURE - WHICH HAS REDUCED CO2 EMISSIONS BY 20%!ENEL'S TORRE STATION IS A 660 MW POWER STATION, PREVIOUSLY OIL-FIRED, WHICH PRODUCED 2,485,980 TONNES OF CO2, 456,608 TONNES MORE THAN THE UK GAS-FIRED POWER STATION AT BALLYLUMFORD C, A 616 MW STATION WHICH IN 2007 EMITTED 2,029,372 TONNES OF CO2.THE ENEL'S TORRE NEW COAL-FIRED POWER STATION IS NOW PRODUCING 1,988,784 TONNES OF CO2 OR 40,588 TONNES LESS THAN THE 2,029.372 TONNES AT THE GAS-FIRED POWER STATION AT BALLYLUMFORD C.THE TECHNOLOGY IN ITALY WAS DEVELOPED WITHIN THREE YEARS, DEMONSTRATING THAT IT IS POSSIBLE - EVEN WITHOUT CARBON CAPTURE - FOR MODERN COAL-FIRED POWER STATIONS TO REDUCE CO2 EMISSIONS TO BELOW THE LEVEL OF A COMBINED GAS CYCLE POWER STATION.

CARBON CAPTURE WOULD RESULT IN THE UK'S EXISTING COAL-FIRED POWER STATIONS REDUCING ANNUAL CO2 EMISSIONS TO 10,872,720 TONNES PER YEAR, A 90% REDUCTION.UNTIL THE 1970s BRITAIN PRODUCED ALL ITS GAS FROM UK DEEP MINE COAL AND CAN PRODUCE ALL THE OIL, GAS AND PETROCHEMICALS WE NEED AND THIS INDIGENOUS SOURCE HAS RESERVES OF WELL OVER A THOUSAND YEARS.AN ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT POLICY FOR THE UKTHE UK NEEDS AN INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY WHICH WILL PRODUCE 250 MILLION TONNES OF INDIGENOUS DEEP MINE CLEAN COAL PER YEAR - COAL - FROM WHICH COULD BE EXTRACTED ALL THE ELECTRICITY, OIL, GAS AND PETROCHEMICALS THAT THE PEOPLE OF OUR NATION NEED.ALL EXISTING AND NEW COAL-FIRED POWER STATIONS SHOULD BE FITTED WITH CLEAN COAL TECHNOLOGY INCLUDING CARBON CAPTURE WHICH WOULD REMOVE 90% OF CO2, AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD BE DEVELOPING A MASSIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY BASED ON WIND, WAVE, TIDE, BARRAGE, HYDRO, GEOTHERMAL, SOLAR POWER, INSULATION AND CONSERVATION.WE MUST END THE IMPORT OF COAL, CURRENTLY 43 MILLION TONNES, WHICH IS PRODUCED BY SUBSIDIES, "SLAVE LABOUR" AND CHILD LABOUR, AND END THE IMPORT OF SHALE OIL, TAR SAND AND OTHER SO-CALLED "UNCONVENTIONAL OILS" WHICH ARE THE DIRTIEST FUELS ON THE PLANET YET ARE BEING USED AT POWER STATIONS SUCH AS DRAX TO PRODUCE ELECTRICITY.

WE MUST END OPEN-CAST MINING WHICH IS NOT ONLY A BLIGHT ON THE LANDSCAPE BUT PRODUCES ONE-THIRD MORE CO2­ THAN DEEP MINE COAL.WE MUST END IMPORTS OF GAS AND INSTEAD PRODUCE OUR OWN GAS - AS WE DID UNTIL THE 1970s - FROM UK INDIGENOUS DEEP MINE COAL.WE MUST STOP IMPORTING OIL AND INSTEAD PRODUCE OUR OWN OIL FROM UK DEEP MINE COAL.

WE NEED AN END TO ALL NUCLEAR POWER ELECTRICITY GENERATION, THE MOST DANGEROUS AND UNECONOMIC METHOD OF PRODUCING ELECTRICITY.THE DEATHS AND DISEASE CONNECTED WITH NUCLEAR ENERGY ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION INCLUDING URANIUM MINING, RADIATION AND DISASTERS SUCH AS WINDSCALE, THREE MILE ISLAND AND CHERNOBYL SHOULD IN THEMSELVES BE SUFFICIENT TO CONVINCE ANYONE THAT THIS NUCLEAR MADNESS SHOULD BE PHASED OUT IMMEDIATELY.WE NEED TO END DEFORESTATION - WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF 20% OF CO2 EMISSIONS WORLD-WIDE AND ACCOUNTS FOR 15% OF CO2 IN THE UK - AND END BIO-FUEL DEVELOPMENT - WHICH NOT ONLY PRODUCES SUBSTANTIAL CO2 EMISSIONS BUT CAUSES MASS STARVATION AND HIGHER FOOD PRICES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.WE NEED AN ENVIRONMENT POLICY WHICH WILL REDUCE EMISSIONS OF CO2, METHANE, CHLORO FLUORO CARBONS (CFCs), NITROGEN OXIDE (NOX­), NITROUS OXIDE (N2O), OZONE (O3), SULPHUR DIOXIDE (SO2) AND STOP DEFORESTATION.

WE NEED TO REMOVE FROM OUR ROADS THE JUGGERNAUTS AND AS MANY VEHICLES AS POSSIBLE AND INSTEAD CONSTRUCT A MODERN ELECTRIC RAIL SYSTEM TOGETHER WITH TRAMS IN OUR TOWNS AND CITIES WHICH WOULD REDUCE CO2 AND OTHER GAS EMISSIONS BY BETWEEN 15% AND 20%.CONCLUSIONTHE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE MEASURES TOGETHER WITH AN INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY BASED ON CLEAN COAL TECHNOLOGY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY CAN PLAY A LEADING PART IN HELPING REDUCE RISING SEA LEVELS.

WE MUST BEGIN TO DESALINATE SEA WATER ON A MASS SCALE AND PROVIDE CLEAN WATER TO THOSE PARTS OF THE WORLD WHICH ARE CURRENTLY BEING SUBJECTED TO DROUGHTS WHICH HAVE TURNED THEIR LAND INTO DUST-BOWLS, RESULTING IN THOUSANDS OF DEATHS.THE USE OF SEA WATER IN THIS WAY WILL REDUCE THE RISE IN SEA LEVELS DRAMATICALLY AND MAKE THE DESERTS BLOOM AND PROVIDE MILLIONS OF HUMAN BEINGS WITH THE BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE.

WE NEED A WORLD WHERE PEOPLE HAVE ENOUGH FOOD, CLOTHING, HOUSING AND ENERGY TO ENSURE THAT THEIR LIVES AND THOSE OF THEIR CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN ARE EQUAL TO THE STANDARD THAT WE IN THE WEST HAVE ENJOYED FOR THE PAST 50 YEARS.

IF WE DO THAT, THEN WE CAN NOT ONLY CLAIM TO HAVE PRODUCED A SENSIBLE INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY BUT ALSO AN ENVIRONMENT POLICY WHICH WILL HELP TRANSFORM THE PLANET ON WHICH WE LIVE.

ARTHUR SCARGILL

The Future Will Not Be Nuclear

(Prospect Magazine September 2008)

The government is pinning its hopes on a nuclear renaissance to meet Britain’s climate change goals. Planning procedures are being eased and hidden subsidies offered. But the policy is based on a misunderstanding of nuclear power’s lousy economics, and will fail

Tom Burke

Gordon Brown does not dither about nuclear power. His commitment to it is emphatic, advancing since the start of the year from a policy of simply replacing Britain’s existing nuclear capacity to one of doubling it, and now to there being no upper limit to its share of electricity generation. Brown has undertaken a radical reform of the nuclear regulatory and planning processes, aimed at clearing the path for new reactors. It is therefore particularly poignant that this is a policy doomed to fail.

Energy prices are rising, the climate is changing and power stations are closing—so we need more nuclear power. So runs the overwhelming volume of argument in the media. But what is missing is any critical examination of the case that underpins these dire warnings from ministers and utility industry nabobs about the lights going out. The lights are not going to go out. The government’s nuclear policy will fail. And all that will really matter is that we will have lost precious time in switching to a more climate-friendly method of electricity generation.We live, these days, in what Eric Hobsbawm calls a “permanent present.” Even recent history is quickly forgotten. Somewhere in my personal archive are the minutes of a cabinet meeting held in October 1979, which arrived on my desk at Friends of the Earth in a proverbial brown envelope. They recorded the decision of Margaret Thatcher’s newly elected government to build ten nuclear reactors. The arguments were familiar. Oil prices were rising, An energy gap was imminent. Without a crash programme of nuclear reactors we would freeze in the dark. Sixteen years later, just one reactor had been built, at Sizewell in Suffolk. It cost more than double the original estimate. No one froze in the dark.




The story of British nuclear power

There is nothing in the history of nuclear power in Britain to inspire confidence. Most of our 19 reactors, which together have the capacity to generate 12,000 megawatts (MW), are of a design unique to Britain. These Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) were in 1974 described by Arthur Hawkins, chairman of the then-nationalised industry that placed the orders, as “a catastrophe.” Today, four are not working, reducing from 20 to 15 per cent the share of electricity that is produced by nuclear.A popular mythology has developed that blames the nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island in the US and Chernobyl in Ukraine for the demise of nuclear power in Britain. Lately, the planning system has been added to this mythology. In fact, the only obstacle in the way of nuclear power for the last 20 years has been the unwillingness of electricity generators to take the risk. By the time of Chernobyl, in 1986, no nuclear power station had been ordered in Britain for eight years and in the US for 12. And the public inquiry that considered the application to build Sizewell B began in 1983 and took two years—only six months longer than the government now expects its accelerated planning procedures to take. The government then took two further years to give the go-ahead. Sizewell B opened in 1995, having taken a further eight years to build.
What actually killed nuclear power in Britain was Thatcher’s decision to privatise the Central Electricity Generating Board—the previously nationalised generation utility. The City took one look at the books and told the government that the nuclear power stations were unsellable. They were promptly withdrawn from sale. The later privatisation of most of Britain’s nuclear power stations was only possible because the burden of the decommissioning and waste management costs—now standing at over £70bn—was transferred to the taxpayer. This was a good example of a practice that has been much in the news lately in relation to the banking industry: privatising profits and socialising losses. So much for market discipline. It is an irony that the government’s preferred plan for a nuclear renaissance involves renationalising British Energy as a French state-controlled utility.

Thatcher was as convinced about nuclear power as Brown. She was defeated by the lousy economics. Nuclear power has few attractions for private sector investors, especially in a competitive electricity market. All long-term investment in future electricity generation involves risks and uncertainties (including the price that will be put on carbon emissions). But nuclear power’s risk profile is the worst. To be economic, nuclear power stations need to be very large (at least 1,000MW) and built in a series, ideally four or six at a time, probably on the site of existing stations. They are very capital intensive at both the start and end of their lives and, because of the initial costs, much more sensitive to the cost of capital, which can add 40 per cent or more to construction costs. They take a long time to build, and, when built, have to run continuously into a market where the wholesale electricity price can change constantly. The operators have to make adequate provision for the (currently unquantifiable) costs of waste disposal.

Coal-fired stations take perhaps three to five years to build, cost a lot less per unit of generation capacity and have no back-end liabilities to speak of. They are economic to build singly and therefore each new one is less at risk of failing to sell the power it produces. Gas-fired stations can be built in smaller units much more quickly, and so are even easier to match to shifting demand. Wind turbines can be built in very small tranches, even faster than gas.
Very high, uncertain and rising capital costs on a project that will produce no revenues for a decade or more are not a compelling proposition at the best of times. Add a host of hard-to-quantify sociopolitical risks, and it is not difficult to see why nuclear power programmes have always relied on large and sustained public subsidies.

Why is nuclear power so expensive?

There are only two honest answers to the question of how much it costs to build a nuclear power station. These are “I don’t know” and “I’ll tell you when I’ve built it.” Everything else is a guess. These may come in official volumes stuffed full of impressive-looking data, but they are still guesses. Some numbers will illustrate the point. Between 1966 and 1967, reactor costs in the US exceeded estimates by an average 209 per cent. Between 1968 and 1969 they went up 294 per cent. Between 1970 and 1971 they went up 348 per cent. 1972 to 1973 was a good year, they only went up 318 per cent. But by 1974 to 1975 they were back up to 381 per cent. In 1976 they only went up 169 per cent. But by then the American utilities had given up. They have not ordered a nuclear reactor since 1974. We did little better. The cost of building Sizewell B went up “only” from £1.7bn to £3.7bn during construction.The government’s commitment to new nuclear power stations is based on just such guesses. The cost of a reactor is normally quantified by what it costs to build each kilowatt (kW) of its capacity to generate electricity. To find the cost, you multiply this by the reactor’s size—measured in thousands of kW, or megawatts (MW). To this must be added the cost of financing the expenditure. In its January white paper on nuclear energy, the government’s worst-case analysis assumed that the construction cost would be £1,625/kW, giving a total cost (based on a reactor size of 2,200MW) of £3.6bn. But in May, the German utility company E.ON estimated the cost at just over £3,000/kW, making the overall cost of a new reactor close to £6.7bn. Other recent guesses range from $4,000/kW (£2,162) early in 2007 to $10,000/kW in January 2008 (£5,000). This certainly looks like “I don’t know” to me.

Nuclear enthusiasts argue that everything is different now. Lessons have been learned, designs have been standardised and new reactors can be built on time and to budget. But the fact that none of the three designs under consideration in Britain is operating anywhere in the world might give pause for thought.Recent events in Finland provide further grounds for caution. There, French company Areva is building the first example of the reactor design most favoured for Britain, the so-called EPR. It has not been a success. The 1,200MW reactor is more than £1bn over its original £2.5bn budget and two years late just two years after construction began. If this is the best Finnish contractors can manage, the thought of what those who brought you the Scottish parliament or Wembley stadium might accomplish is chilling.

This is not just, or even mainly, about incompetence. Nuclear costs are rising disproportionately. This escalation—14 per cent a year after inflation, according to one estimate—has many causes. Nuclear power stations are intensive in metal and concrete, and their construction requires specialist skills. So they have been hit harder than other forms of power generation by the surge in engineering costs. The nuclear supply chain has atrophied in the quarter century since there were last large programmes in the OECD countries. In the US there are now only 80 nuclear-qualified suppliers of key components, compared to 400 a decade ago.

And there is only one global provider—the Japan Steel Works (JSW)—of the heavy forging capacity needed for reactor pressure vessels. JSW is already hard-pressed by demand for new refinery equipment and can only supply five new reactor vessels a year, although it wishes to double capacity to ten vessels. But the need to fund this investment is itself contributing to rising prices, which have increased by 12 per cent in six months, and JSW now requires a 30 per cent down payment on an order. It takes six years from the date of the order to get other key components, including reactor coolant pumps and control and instrumentation equipment
The human resources needed to resuscitate the nuclear industry are in even shorter supply. Before you can even apply for permission to build a nuclear power station, you need approval for the design you plan on using. This can take several years. Yet inspectors and engineers are leaving Britain’s Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), some to retirement and others to more lucrative employment with contractors hoping to come to the nuclear party. The NII now has only 16 people to carry out the detailed safety approval of new reactors, a task estimated to need at least 40. What this means is that if you wanted to have a reactor up and running in Britain by 2020, you would need to have sought approval some time ago. Generous pay rises, relocation from Merseyside and a new management structure are all proposed to relieve this bottleneck. But these reforms will need time to become anchored if we are to avoid an unacceptable choice between speed and safety.

The government has pledged that there will be no subsidies for new nuclear construction. But this was never credible, and it is already possible to detect signs of retreat. In 2006 the government bravely promised to “make sure that the full costs of new nuclear waste are paid by the market.” By 2008 this had mutated into the more nuanced: “The government will [set] a fixed unit price [for] waste disposal at the time when approvals for the station are given.” This effectively caps the costs of nuclear waste disposal to the operator and transfers the risk of cost overruns on to the taxpayer. It is hard to argue that this is not a subsidy.

Furthermore, as Stephen Thomas from Greenwich University has pointed out, if you take E.ON’s estimate of the cost of a new reactor of £3,000/kW, then the operating cost of that reactor is likely to be about £80 to generate a kW of electricity for an hour—a measurement known as a kilowatt hour (kWh). The current wholesale electricity price, which is causing ministers such headaches, is about £40/kWh. We already know what happens to nuclear operators when their operating costs exceed the price at which they can sell electricity. In 2002 British Energy lost money hand over fist and found itself technically insolvent. But the company did not go bust. In a prequel to Northern Rock, the government bailed it out to the tune of some £4bn, taking a large stake in the business. (British Energy is now profitable, thanks to rises in fossil fuel prices.)

This precedent helps to explain why utilities companies are looking at nuclear power. They know that once Britain has started down this road, there will be no going back, as other investment will be suppressed. The “no subsidies” rule will be a distant memory. The utilities companies will be in a strong position to extract from taxpayer and consumer alike what they need to keep going.

Closing the generation gap

The idea that the world is on the dawn of a new nuclear age is no less of a fantasy now than it was in the early 1970s. Even the nuclear-supporting International Energy Agency’s projections have little more nuclear power in operation in 2030 than there is now. That is because most of our present reactor fleet was built in a rush in the 1970s. Even with extensions, these are coming to the end of their lives. Much is made of the 32 reactors now under construction around the world, mostly in Asia. But 11 of them have been under construction for more than 20 years. Just to maintain the current number of reactors by 2025, we would have to build 250 more reactors than are currently under construction—or 15 a year between now and 2025. The build rate since 2000, almost all in Asia, has been one a year. Increasing this is certainly possible, but to do so by 15 times despite shortages of materials and manpower—and during a credit crunch—seems fanciful.

Britain is a very long way from facing a choice of building more nuclear or freezing in the dark. There is a real problem—three problems to be precise—with energy security, but none can be solved by nuclear power. The most urgent is the threat of interruptions to our oil supply, which could bring Britain to a halt. But our oil for transport cannot be replaced by nuclear electricity. Preventing instability in the middle east and reducing oil dependence by more efficient transport and logistics are the solutions here.

Much has been made of the threat of becoming overdependent on imported gas, particularly from Russia. Leaving aside that Russia is more dependent on our revenues than we are on its gas, half of our gas is used for heating domestic space and water, and cannot be replaced without a big transformation of our infrastructure. More is used for industrial processes, leaving under a third for electricity generation. But much of that is used to generate electricity at peak times because gas turbines are easy to switch on and off to meet short-term demand spikes. Nuclear power stations must be run continuously to be economic.
Ministers now often invoke the “generation gap” that will emerge as some 22,000MW of existing coal and nuclear capacity is closed between now and 2020, much by 2015. If this is not replaced by new nuclear power, runs the argument, then carbon-intensive gas or coal will have to be used at the expense of the climate. The British head of EDF, Vincent de Rivas, promises that he can deliver new nuclear electricity to the grid by 2017. But the government’s own nuclear consultation is more realistic. It assumes that were an order placed today under its accelerated regulatory procedures, it would still be eight years before construction started. For a wholly new design, construction would take a further five years, at least. The government has yet to explain how a power station that won’t open before 2021 can meet a “generation gap” it expects to appear by 2015.

Of course, no government will let the lights go out. So this generation gap is more a rhetorical device than a genuine threat. The government is now committed to producing at least 35 per cent of our energy from renewable sources by 2020. That may fill some of the purported gap. Energy efficiency will fill more. If nuclear cannot fill the remainder—perhaps 2,500MW—then coal will do it.

Some doubt whether the renewables target is achievable. In fact, it is more likely to be met than Brown’s hopes for nuclear. Last year the world added about 2,000MW of additional nuclear capacity through improving the performance of existing reactors. Photovoltaic solar energy alone, one of the least economically attractive of the renewables, added 2,300MW. Wind power, which on many estimates already delivers electricity more cheaply than nuclear, added eight times as much.

Nuclear power is a low-carbon source of electricity, and will therefore avoid whatever tax is levied on carbon emissions. But it won’t help Britain meet its climate change targets. The goal is to keep the eventual rise in global average temperature to below 2 degrees Celsius—the threshold of dangerous climate change. This means that greenhouse gas emissions must peak before 2020 and then decline steeply. But if building the 15 reactors a year needed to replace the world’s current capacity is going to be impossible—as it is—it is difficult to see how it could play a bigger role in reducing global carbon emissions.

The top climate priority is to very quickly make coal use carbon-neutral by deploying carbon capture and storage technologies. This is mainly for geopolitical reasons. The International Energy Agency forecasts 14,000MW of new coal-fired power stations by 2030. China is building new coal-fired plants at the rate of 2,000MW a week. It also has the world’s most ambitious nuclear power programme, aiming to build 40 nuclear power stations by 2030. This latter effort would still provide only 4 per cent of China’s electricity. Three quarters will come from coal. If this happens without the Chinese using carbon capture and storage, the government, and the world, will not achieve its climate change objectives. We will be saying hello to a four degree jump in temperatures and goodbye to prosperity and security for 60m Britons.
If we want others to make their coal burning carbon-neutral, we must do so ourselves. Actions speak louder than words. In the next three years, Britain will spend £2.8bn a year on cleaning up its nuclear legacy. We will spend nothing on deploying carbon capture and storage—the world’s most important technology for ensuring climate security.

No one should doubt the good intentions of those who are arguing for a switch of scarce capital, materials and skills into nuclear power in Britain. It is not their intentions that are in question, but their analysis. We have been here before, with equally serious people arguing that there was no alternative to a nuclear future. In 1975 the UK Atomic Energy Authority told the royal commission on environmental pollution that by 2000 Britain would have 104 nuclear reactors. This did not happen not because the nuclear industry lacked support. Then, as now, government, business leaders, the unions and the media were all onside. It failed because economic reality intruded. It will do so again—but this time the consequence of going down the nuclear cul-de-sac will be much more serious.

Tom Burke is environmental policy adviser to Rio Tinto. He is a fellow of the Energy Institute and co-founder of E3G. He is writing in a personal capacity

Coal isn’t the climate enemy. It’s part of the solution

We must draw on existing resources as part of an integrated energy policy, not flirt with nuclear, the most dangerous option.

Link to this audio

Coal power is far safer, says former National Union of Mineworkers leader Arthur Scargill in reply to a pro-nuclear article by green campaigner George Monbiot .
Has George Monbiot sold out on his environmental credentials or is he suffering from amnesia? In his article on these pages last Tuesday he states that he has now reached the point where he no longer cares whether or not the answer to climate change is nuclear - let it happen, he says.

Has he not read the evidence presented by environmentalists such as Tony Benn and me at the Windscale, Sizewell and Hinckley Point public inquiries? Is he unaware that nuclear-power generated electricity is the most expensive form of energy - 400% more expensive than coal - or that it received £6bn in subsidies, with £70bn to be paid by taxpayers in decommissioning costs? Is he unaware that there is no known way of disposing of nuclear waste, which will contaminate the planet for thousands of years? Has he forgotten the nuclear disasters at Windscale, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl?

We are facing an economic and political crisis on a scale similar to the Wall Street crash in 1929, the mass unemployment which affected the UK and Europe in the 1930s and the energy crisis in the early 70s.

We are facing a monumental energy crisis, yet we live on an island with more than 1,000 years of coal reserves from which we can provide all the electricity, oil, gas and petrochemicals that people need, without causing harm to the environment. Britain - despite its massive indigenous deep-mine coal reserves - has never had an integrated energy policy based on coal and renewables, and as a consequence we are now facing the worst energy crisis in our history.

Since the end of the second world war, both Labour and Tory governments have sought to replace Britain’s vast coal reserves with a false promise of “cheap” imported oil, “cheap, safe” nuclear energy and “cheap” natural gas - policies that have not only cost the British people billions of pounds, but resulted in the near-extinction of Britain’s deep-mine coal industry, the virtual exhaustion of North Sea gas and oil, and massive economic costs and environmental problems associated with nuclear power.

After the closure of 192 pits since 1980, the loss of 170,000 jobs and the closure or non-operation of nearly 70% of coal-fired power stations on the false premise that they were uneconomic and the worst polluter of carbon dioxide, it is reasonable to expect that there would have been a dramatic fall in CO2 emissions. But in fact CO2 emissions have actually increased - not that surprising, since more than 80% of CO2 emissions are produced by oil and gas from power stations, road transport, industry, shipping and domestic use. That fact alone should cause Monbiot to rethink.
Britain needs an integrated energy policy that will produce 250m tonnes of indigenous deep-mine clean coal per year - from which could be extracted all the electricity, oil, gas and petrochemicals that our people need.
All existing and new coal-fired power stations should be fitted with clean coal technology - including carbon capture that would remove all CO2 - and at the same time we should be developing a massive renewable energy policy based on wind, wave, tide, barrage, hydro, geothermal, solar power, together with insulation, conservation and reforestation.

We must end the import of coal, (currently 43m tonnes a year) which is produced by subsidies, “slave labour” and child labour, and end the import of shale oil, tar sands and other so-called unconventional oils, which are the dirtiest fuels on the planet but are being used to produce electricity.
We still do not know - because of the security and secrecy laws - the full extent of the disaster at Windscale (Sellafield) in 1957 or Three Mile Island in the US in 1979, but we do know that the incidence of cancer and leukaemia - particularly among children - is 10% higher in or around nuclear power stations, and we know from experts such as Robert Gale - who treated the victims at Chernobyl in 1986 - that more than 100,000 will die over a 30-year period.

We need an end to all nuclear-powered electricity generation, the most dangerous and uneconomic method of producing electricity. We need an end to deforestation, which is the cause of 20% of CO2 emissions worldwide, and an end to biofuel development - which not only produces substantial CO2 emissions but is causing mass starvation and higher food prices throughout the world.
Only by the introduction of a real integrated energy policy based on clean coal technology and renewable energies, can we begin to meet the needs of people in the UK and throughout the world.

I challenge George Monbiot to test out which is the most dangerous fuel - coal or nuclear power. I am prepared to go into a room full of CO2 for two minutes, if he is prepared to go into a room full of radiation for two minutes.

· Arthur Scargill is the leader of the Socialist Labour party. He was president of the National Union of Mineworkers 1982-2002.

· He is now lifelong Honorary President of the NUM.

Article is from the Guardian newspaper of 8/8/8